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BOOK REVIEW
Juridical Positivism and Human Rights. Mieczyslaw Maneli.*
New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1981. pp. 406, $24.95.
Reviewed by W. Glen Watts**
Mieczyslaw Maneli was Professor of Law at Warsaw Univer-
sity in Poland. Dismissed during the anti-liberal purges of 1968,
he emigrated to the United States. The author of some twelve
books and hundreds of essays and articles, he is an internationally
recognized authority on legal philosophy in both Western and
Eastern Europe. He is currently the co-founder and Chairman of
the Center for the Study of Ethics and Public Policy at Queens
College, the City University of New York.
Maneli has written a thorough and spirited defense of "jurid-
ical positivism." He defines juridical positivism as a philosophical
synthesis of traditional positivism, American "realistic" jurispru-
dence, as well as national and international norms relating to
human rights. In his view it is a theory of law adjusted to the
social realities, as well as the national and international economic
and political tensions, which characterize life in the last decades
of the twentieth century.
Juridical positivism has been criticized in the Communist
countries for being a "bourgeois ideology," and in the West for
being a source of corruption and totalitarianism. Maneli argues
that juridical positivism from Bentham to the present has never
been an uncritical "establishment theory," supporting existing
laws and regimes whether in the West or the East. He believes
that this theory can and should promote the creation of new legal
provisions, and institutions, as well as new interpretations of ex-
isting laws.
Maneli tried to reverse the notion that positivism is an ideal
tool for tyrants. Since it recognizes no laws except those enacted
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by a state, it supposedly leaves the citizens helpless to oppose op-
pressive or unjust laws. Maneli argues that this view of positivism
has been perpetuated by "natural law theorists," who have devel-
oped a mythological view of law as an expression of timeless
moral law.
Maneli does not deny that moral norms exist. Some of these
moral beliefs may lend support to some of the legal norms of a
society, but others may not. Maneli insists that morality exists be-
cause some group in the society regards such norms as part of
their internalized code for regulating their conduct. But he like-
wise accepts the pluralistic nature of modern society; and that
there will never be universal acceptance of any one moral system
in our societies. Likewise, moral systems and codes are not static
but changing. And he maintains that struggles between different
ways of viewing social reality and the impact of one's actions on
others will always be occurring. Likewise, he recognizes that in all
societies there are periods in which dialogue and compromise fail,
and unfortunately violence ensues.
Law is not and cannot be a panacea for all social diseases ....
Legal norms exist because our earth is not a paradise but is full of
vices and passions. In these human conditions moral and legal norms
must coexist, fight each other, support and defeat each other. There
must be an endless interplay, cooperation, and struggle between law
and morality, and these conflicts can either be resolved by a dia-
logue, arguments, or compromise or, in the absence of amicable set-
tlements, there will be violence; then it will be force that will decide
what is 'just' or 'unjust.'"
For Maneli law can be law even if it violates someone's moral
code, but that does not mean a person must obey these provisions.
He does not recognize any general obligation to obey the law.
Maneli recognizes the right to revolt if the situation in a country
is dire enough, whereas, natural law theorists argue that "immoral
law" is not law and therefore need not be obeyed.
While Maneli thinks the law should support freedom of
speech, and press, as do natural law theorists, he points out that
unless citizens can communicate and have free access to the nec-
essary information, these freedoms will not amount to much. And
every society needs to make improvements in this regard, includ-
ing the United States. For unless communication, dialogue, and
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the probing of argument, evidence, and assumption are permitted,
citizens, no less than legislators and judges, will not have access to
the means they need to address the pressing problems they are
seeking to resolve. The result will be the compounding of
problems, resentments, and the increasing of tension and turmoil
for the society.
Maneli thinks that a modern day Antigone has better re-
course in appealing to the letter of the law than to an unchanging
moral law. The wide acceptance by most sovereign states of the
Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, as well as principles which at least pay lip service
to human rights, makes this possible. Given these facts, a modern
day tyrant like Creon is embarrassed by appeals to the law he is
violating in forbidding a contemporary Antigone from burying her
dead brother. The appeal to a higher norm which is eternal and
unchanging only obscures matters.
Maneli believes that there is no contemporary legal code in
the world today, whether in Eastern or Western Europe, which
can be accepted by the citizens of that state as somehow guaran-
teeing them a safe, orderly and just life. What citizens must do is
accept the conflict and change that is inevitable, given the chang-
ing economic and political forces at work in our respective socie-
ties, and remain vigilant in striving to defend and protect their
interests and needs from encroachment by others or by the state
itself.
Modern day tyrants whether in Communist, Socialist, or
Capitalist countries operate more by subterfuge, propaganda, in-
doctrination, and concealment of fact than by open admission of
having violated anyone's rights. It is for this reason that Maneli
believes the best way to oppose oppressive acts by rulers is to chal-
lenge their actions as illegal both within the courts of one's coun-
try, and also before international forums such as the United Na-
tions. As he says:
In totalitarian states . . . democratic and progressive legal norms
• . . are the last life preserver that the oppressed citizens may look
to. The security police can violate . . . these liberties. But . . . the
victim knows his rights and can claim them; the oppressor knows
that he has violated the law, he must hide his violations, must con-
sider . . . the possibility of future punishment, which has not been
evaded by much more powerful violators than he."
2. Id. at 365.
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Law shares with other areas of normative discourse a com-
mon vocabulary, which makes it easy to confuse statements about
legal systems and moral duties. Words like "right," "duty," "obli-
gation" occur in both moral and legal discourse. Part of the
strength of positivism, and of Maneli's defense of it is his attempt
at avoiding blurring the distinction between these two different
ways of speaking about the same and similar phenomena.
Maneli is to be commended for writing a book which at-
tempts to develop a theory of law which goes beyond the conven-
tional boundaries of the subject. He has also contributed to a bet-
ter understanding of Eastern European thinking on law, whether
for countries behind the iron curtain, or not. His concern with the
protection of the rights of the citizen under different types of gov-
ernment is one that many of us share. We need to remember his
warning that there are no guarantees in any of our societies. The
price of freedom will continue to be vigilance and a sturdy self-
reliance. As Maneli states: "Law is always and everywhere only a
part of the social and political system, only one of many institu-
tions existing in society . . . Even the best laws cannot create
what the society, or at least its active part, does not want to
accomplish."'
3. Id. at 296.
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